Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) is a technique for downloading mobile code on a host machine while ensuring that the code adheres to the host's safety policy. We show how certied abstract interpretation can be used to build a PCC architecture where the code producer can produce program certicates automatically. Code consumers use proof checkers derived from certied analysers to check certicates. Proof checkers carry their own correctness proofs and accepting a new proof checker amounts to type checking the checker in Coq. Certicates take the form of strategies for reconstructing a xpoint and are kept small due to a technique for xpoint compression. The PCC architecture has been implemented and evaluated experimentally on a byte code language for which we have designed an interval analysis that allows to generate certicates ascertaining that no array-out-of-bounds accesses will occur.
Introduction
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) is a technique for downloading mobile code on a host machine while ensuring that the code adheres to the host's safety policy.
The basic idea is that the code producer sends the code with a proof (in a suitably chosen logic) that the code is secure. Upon reception of the code, the code consumer submits the proof to a proof checker for the logic. Thus, in the basic PCC architecture, the only components that have to be trusted are the program logic, the proof checker of the logic and the formalisation of the safety property in this logic. Neither the mobile code nor the proposed safety proof have to be trusted. In his seminal work, Necula [20] axiomatises the program using a Hoare-like logic. For a given safety policy, this logic comes together with a verication condition generator (VCGen) that generates lemmas, the proofs of which are sucient to ensure the property. For each lemma, a machine-checkable proof term has to be generated by the code producer. One weakness of the initial approach is that the soundness of the verication condition generator is not proved but taken for granted, having as consequence that there were errors in that code that escaped the thorough testing of the infrastructure [23] .
The foundational proof carrying code (FPCC) of Appel [2, 3] gives stronger semantic foundations to PCC by generating verication conditions directly from the operational semantics rather than from some program logic, but the proofs are accordingly more complicated to produce. An alternative approach is presented by Nipkow and Wildmoser [27] who prove the soundness of a weakest precondition calculus with respect to the byte code semantics for a reasonable subset of Java byte code. Verication conditions are proved using a hybrid approach that use both trusted and untrusted provers. An example of a trusted prover is the byte code verier that Klein and Nipkow have formalised and proved correct in Isabelle [15] . Untrusted provers are external static analysers that suggest potential (inductive) invariants. These invariants are then reproved inside Isabelle to obtain a transmittable program certicate.
Abstract interpretation is another technique for proving invariants of programs and Albert, Hermenegildo and Puebla have proposed to use the xpoint generated by an abstract interpretation as the certicate. Their analysis-carrying code approach [1] is a PCC framework for constraint logic programs in which the checker veries that a proposed certicate is a xpoint of an abstract interpretation of the communicated program. This solves the problem of producing the certicates automatically but requires the code consumer to take for granted the semantic correctness of the abstract interpretation. It is thus prone to the same objections as those made against the initial PCC framework where the code consumer had to trust the correctness of the verication condition generator. In this paper we show how to improve on this situation by developing a foundational PCC architecture based on certied abstract interpretation [7] which is a technique for extracting a static analyser from the constructive proof of its semantic correctness. The technique produces at the same time an analyser and a proof object certifying its semantic correctness.
This proof object can then be communicated to the code consumer for verication. We describe how this leads to an infrastructure that allows to download specialised proof-checkers carrying their own correctness proof (Section 2).
These proof checkers are derived automatically in a functorial way from a certied analysis.
An important issue in PCC is that of optimising (i.e., minimising) the size of certicates. In the context of abstract interpretation-based PCC, this amounts to the compression of xpoints, as e.g. it is done in lightweight byte code verication [25, 26] . In Sections 5 and 6 we propose a fully automatic xpoint compression algorithm that generates compressed certicates from the results of untrusted static analysers. We have evaluated the feasibility of the approach and the eciency of the xpoint compression on the problem of communicating proof that a byte code program will not perform any illegal array accesses. As part of this experiment we have dened (and certied) an interval analysis for byte code that combines the standard interval-based abstract interpretation with a modicum of symbolic evaluation, resulting in a novel abstract domain of syntactic expressions (Section 4). This extension is required in order to have a suciently precise analysis; at the same time it shows that complex analyses are within reach of certication and hence can be used for foundational, abstract interpretation-based PCC.
A PCC architecture with certied proof checkers
In the following, we propose an extensible PCC architecture based on abstract interpretation which allows to download dedicated, certied proof-checkers safely. The architecture, summarised in Figure 1 , is bootstrapped by the code consumer with a general purpose proof checker, here Coq [9] . The certication of a program is done using a two-step protocol between the code producer and the code consumer. In the rst step, the producer queries the consumer in order to know whether it possesses the relevant proof-checker. If not, the producer sends the checker together with its soundness proof. This soundness proof is then veried automatically by a general-purpose proof checker (here, the Coq type checker) and if verication succeeds, the now certied checker is installed. In this way, the architecture combines the advantages of both a trustworthy general-purpose proof checker and exible specialised proof checkers. Once the proof checker has been installed, the consumer is ready to download the program of the code producer. As it is customary in PCC, the code producer sends the program packaged with a certicate to be checked by the previously downloaded proof checker. This certicate can be obtained using optimised, un-trusted xpoint solvers and compressors since it will be checked upon reception.
We use the program extraction mechanism of Coq to extract ecient Caml checkers from their Coq specication. Extraction is using the proofs-as-programs paradigm to erase those parts of a proof term that only concerns the proof of properties and which do not contribute to the specied computation. A formal account of Coq current extraction can be found in Letouzey's thesis [17] .
It would, in principle, have been possible to execute the Coq specication directly since the Coq proof-checker implements strong normalisation of lambda terms. However, this mechanism is at the moment not ecient enough to make such an approach viable (recent progress in the implementation of strong reduction [13] may change this in the future). • Together with the Coq proof-checker and extraction mechanism, the specication of the semantics and safety property form the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of the PCC architecture. In Figure 1 , these trusted components are located in the upper-right corner of the consumer side. Other components of the consumer are not part of the TCB:
• Downloaded checkers (upper left corner) are only trusted if they type-check;
• Extracted checkers inherit trust from type-checked checkers.
Program extraction excluded, the TCB of Figure 1 is exactly the TCB of Foundational PCC a proof-checker and a formal specication of the program semantics and safety property. Program extraction is the price we pay for an ecient checker. This has the side-eect that the Caml compiler must also be counted among the trusted components. In theory, moving the Caml compiler outside the TCB can be done by providing a Coq correctness proof of it. The recent correctness proof of a C compiler back-end [16] shows the feasibility of this approach.
Given a program p, the code producer has to provide a machine-checkable proof that p is safe. These proofs can be tedious and time-consuming to produce by hand. In this paper, we show how to use abstract interpretation to construct program certicates in a fully automatic way. In this approach, programs are automatically annotated with program properties (elements of abstract domains) together with a reconstruction strategy (to be described in detail in Section 5). A reconstruction strategy consists of a series of steps that allow to verify that the program properties form a program invariant that implies the security policy.
The certied checkers implement the signature expressed by the Coq module Checker in Figure 2 . This module rst contains a denition of the format of certicates. The function checker takes two arguments: a program P and a candidate certicate cert generated by an untrusted external prover. If the checker function returns true, the companion theorem checker_ok ensures that the program is safe, as dened in Denition 2.1. Thus, the successful type checking of a module against the signature Checker proves that the checker is correct.
Module Type Checker.
Parameter certificate:Set. Parameter checker : program → certificate → bool. Parameter checker_ok : ∀ P cert, checker P cert = true → P ⊆(Safe P). End Checker. 3 A Coq signature of certied static analyses
The notion of certied analysis is based on previous work on programming a static analyser in Coq [7, 24] . We recall the main components of such a formalisation and explain how they are used for proof-carrying code.
Certied abstract interpretation for PCC
A certied analysis is a Coq function analyse ∈ Pgm → bool which for a given program p either proves the safety of p (and returns true) or fails:
The analyser and its Coq correctness proof are built in four main steps. We stress that the following domains, functions and relations are all Coq objects that for presentational purposes are written using ordinary mathematical notation.
(1) An abstract domain State , , , with a lattice structure is introduced, modelling the relative precision of elements in State . In the concrete world, property precision is modelled with the partial order ⊆. (2) An abstract semantics is then specied as any post-xpoint of a wellchosen abstract function F p ∈ State → State . The correctness of this 1 Because we only focus on soundness of the abstract interpreters, the classic notion of Galois connection [11] is not mandatory here. Instead we require γ to be a meet morphism, i.e. γ(s 1 s 2 ) = γ(s 1 ) ∩ γ(s 2 ). This is equivalent to the existence of the corresponding Galois connection when State , , , , is complete and denotes the general greatest lower bound (on sets instead of two values). 
(3) A post-xpoint solver solve ∈ Pgm → State is then dened, based on xpoint iteration techniques.
(4) An abstract safety test Safe p ∈ State → bool is dened in the abstract world.
Together, these proofs assert that Safe • solve is a correct analyser.
Step (3) constructs a post-xpoint that serves as certicate for showing that the program is safe. However, for our PCC context it is important to observe that it is only the existence of such a post-xpoint that matters for proving safety. Formally, by combining (2) and (4) we have:
In particular, this means that for a proposed certicate s ∈ State , our PCC checker only has to test F p (s ) s ∧ Safe p (s ) = true.
Certied analysis for memory invariants
We now present the Coq denition of certied analyses for languages where the semantic domain is expressed as a set of reachable states, composed of a control point and a memory State = Ctrl × Mem. The abstract domain State = Ctrl → Mem attaches memory invariants to each control point of a
program. We will later show how to compress such abstract states into more compact program certicates that only provide invariants at certain, wellchosen control points. The certied analysis interface is presented in Figure 3 .
The rst element of this signature is the lattice structure AbMem which is the Definition Verif_cstr (C:Constraint) (st : AbState) := AbMem.order (expr C (map st (sources C))) (st (target C)).
Parameter gen_cstr: program → list Cstr.
Definition Approx (P:program) (St : AbState) := ∀ c, c ∈ (gen_cstr P) → Verif_cstr c St.
Parameter analysis_correct : ∀ P st, Approx P st → Secure P st → P ⊆(Safe P). End CertifiedAnalysis. 
Enhanced interval analysis for byte codes
To demonstrate the working of our PCC framework and to test its feasibility we have developed an interval analysis for a simple byte code language.
The analysis is based on existing interval analyses for high-level structured languages [10] but has been extended with an abstract domain of syntactic expressions to obtain a similar precision at byte code level.
Syntax and semantics
The byte code instruction set contains operators for stack and local variable manipulations and for integer arithmetic. Instructions on arrays permit to create, obtain the size of, access and update arrays. The ow of control can be modied unconditionally (with Goto) and conditionally with the family of instructions If_icmpcond which compare the top elements of the run-time stack and branch according to the outcome. Finally, there are instructions for inputting and returning values. This language is suciently general to illustrate the novelties of our approach and perform experiments on code obtained from compilation of Java source code. An extension to the object-oriented layer would follow the lines of the certied analysis for object-oriented (Java Card) byte code already developed by Cachera et al. [7] . The byte code language is given an operational semantics which program states have the form <cp, h, s, l> where cp is a control point to be executed next, h is a heap for storing allocated arrays, s is an operand stack, and l is an environment mapping local variables to values. An array is modelled by a pair consisting of the size of the array and a function that for a given index returns the value stored at that index. A special error state Error is used to model execution errors which here arise from indexing an array outside its bounds.
The operational semantics is dened via a transition relation → between states in a standard fashion and will not be explained in detail. Representative rules of the denition of → are shown in Figure 4 . They illustrate dierent aspects of the byte code language; in particular how array bound checks are performed when accessing an array.
With the introduction of a specic error state, the set of safe states can simply be dened as all states except the Error state. 
For each abstract domain dened above we build the corresponding Coq lattice structure by simply combining lattice functors. We use here the lattice library proposed in [24] . places in the term are related. The exact denition can be found in [6] . for the comprehensive set of constraints). Among these, constraints which model test-and-jump instructions are of particular interest because they make use of the notion of backward abstract interpretation of expressions [10] . It allows to restrict the destination state of the jump according to the information obtained by the test. When a guard of the form e 1 c e 2 is veried (with c a comparison operator and e 1 and e 2 some expression), the current abstract environment l is rened by e 1 c e 2 test (l ). The operator · test ∈ LocVar → LocVar over-approximates the set of environments (l, h) which fulll the guard e 1 c e 2 . 
The checker component of the PCC architecture is the critical part that has to be provably sound as well as space-and time-ecient. In the following, we describe how to generate checkers and certicates that full these requirements.
The certicates attach a piece of information to a subset of the control points. however, be improved. In the following we explain how to design checkers that require signicantly smaller certicates.
Strategies for reconstructing certicates
The naive algorithm requires certicates that provide a complete solution of the analysis: an abstract memory state is attached to each control point. We now describe a proof checker which (implicitly) recomputes the complete solution from a sparse certicate. The core of this checker is a reconstruction algorithm which takes as input a program and a strategy that is interpreted step by step. Upon success, it returns a tagged abstract state from which one can extract (after tag erasure) a correct and safe abstract state.
reconstruct : Pgm → Strategy → option(Ctrl → TagMem)
The datatypes for strategy commands and tagged memories are given below:
Inductive TagMem Definition Strategy := list command.
Tags are used to keep track of the reconstruction status of a control point and carry the following intuitive meaning. For a control point cp:
• Undef means that the abstract memory attached to cp has not been reconstructed yet;
• Hint mem means that mem is proposed as an (untrusted) invariant for cp;
• Checked mem means that mem satises the constraint and the safety condition associated with cp. 
Optimisation of the reconstruction algorithm
The strategies presented so far explicitly yield a witness s that satises the verication conditions of the analysis. However, according to Observation 3.1 it suces for the checker to ensure the existence of such a witnessthere is no need to reconstruct it. This observation leads to an optimised reconstruction algorithm which exploits this weaker requirement to drop on the y abstract memories that are no longer needed by the verication process. This reduces the memory usage of the reconstruction algorithm by keeping the size of the tagged abstract state as small as possible. Theorem 5.6 (Checker) Dene checker (P, strat) ≡ (reconstruct(P, strat) = None).
For all programs P and strategies strat, if checker (P, strat) = true then ∃s , F P (s ) s and Safe P (s ) = true
Generating Certicates
The generation of strategies (a code producer task) is not safety-critical for the PCC infrastructure. However, for our PCC scheme to be feasible, ecient strategies are necessary. In this section we rst show that for any given xpoint a strategy can be generated, and then show how these strategies can be optimised. We introduce the notion of winning strategies which are strategies that verify certain well-formedness conditions with respect to the dependencies between control points. These dependencies informally express that the abstract memory at one control point is needed for the computation of the abstract memory at another control point, and are dened formally as follows. [25] . In this kind of strategies, the Eval commands are implicit and only need to be prexed by Assign commands for each back-edge in the dependency graph.
This leads to very compact strategies at the expense of being sub-optimal in memory usage. We return to this point in Section 9 on related work.
More memory-ecient strategies can be obtained by taking into account the specic topological properties of the control-ow graph (see Denition 6.1).
We Reducible graphs. Reducible graphs are obtained from structured programming languages. As such, our byte code may not structured but any code generated from structured ones will be. For those graphs, an ecient strategy consists in placing Assign commands at loop-headers. Given these loopheaders, the rest of the graph can be decomposed into DAGs for which the DAG strategy applies.
Implementation
We use the program extraction mechanism of Coq to speed up the computations both on the producer and the consumer side. The extraction mechanism in Coq produces Caml programs from Coq terms by eliding those parts of the terms that do not have computational content. Such parts are only necessary to ensure the well typing of the Coq term (and thereby the correctness of the corresponding programs) but are not required for executing the programs.
Strictly speaking, nothing needs to be certied in Coq on the producer side, but parts of the extracted checker can nonetheless be reused. In order to obtain a working analyser, the code extracted from a CertifiedAnalysis structure must be combined with a xpoint iterator for solving the constraint systems.
Such an iterator is a reusable component independent of the specic analysis.
If the extracted code does not scale well, subparts of the abstract domains can be substituted for hand-coded operators in a modular way. This might be relevant for numeric-intensive computations for which purely functional implementations cannot compete with the arithmetics of the processor. These optimisations are local to the producer and serve to speed up the computation of a certicate. They may be unsafe but can at worse lead to certicates that will not be accepted by a certied checker.
On the consumer size, the specication of the certicate checker is a module of type Checker (presented in Section 2). Because the xpoint reconstruction algorithm is analysis independent, certicate checkers can be constructed in a generic fashion from any certied static analysis. This is expressed as a functor which takes as argument a CertifiedAnalysis (cf. Figure 3) and returns a Checker, the interface of which was dened in Figure 2 .
The extracted Caml checker function must be applied to a program p and a certicate cert. Some care must be exercised when deciding on the format of p and cert. The Coq extraction of function is correct only if the extracted function is evaluated on arguments that are well-typed in Coq (see Letouzey's PhD thesis [17] for a formal statement) but the extracted Caml function will have a more permissive type and will thus return a result on arguments which the Coq version of the function would not accept. This means that, potentially, a malicious producer could propose a certicate that would be rejected by Coq but accepted by the Caml type checker. The output of the extracted checker on such a certicate is unspecied by its Coq correctness statement and would provide a security hole in the architecture.
To avoid this pitfall, we dene the Coq certicate type so that it is in bijection with the corresponding extracted type. In our implementation we choose a certicate format of form:
Definition certificate : Set := list bool. • the extracted checker Coq.BytecodeChecker.checker
The functions Parser.parse_main and ReadBit.get_stream are part of the trusted base whereas the function Coq.BytecodeChecker.checker, which was dened above, is certied by Theorem 5.6.
Experiments
We have tested our PCC framework by applying the improved interval analysis described in Section 4 on a number of array-manipulating algorithms for generating certicates for a safety policy stating that the programs do not make array accesses that are out of bounds. The test programs have been chosen because they are all array manipulation-intensive and hence require precise certicates in order to show that they respect this safety policy. We have generated and checked certicates for three classical sorting algorithms (bubble sort, heap sort and quick sort), the Floyd-Warshall algorithm for shortest past computation, and algorithms for polynomial product and vector convolution.
For each algorithm, the enhanced interval analysis described in Section 4 is suciently precise to be able to verify that all array accesses are safe. which can be checked more eciently than they can be produced. Their PCC infrastructure [28] is based on a dedicated safety logic that is used to express local program properties and the overall safety policy. The core of the framework is a generic VCGen that generates verication conditions in the safety logic from the program's control ow graph. The VCG is parameterised on a weakest precondition transformer wpF that for a given instruction in the program and a given post-condition in the safety logic nds a weakest precondition in the safety logic. This wpF transformer must be proved correct with respect to the operational semantics of the particular programming language.
One dierence with the work presented here is that the VCG works on programs annotated with loop invariants. These loop invariants can be provided by an un-certied data ow analyser but they will then have to be re-proved in Isabelle by the code producer in order to obtain a proof that can be communicated to the code consumer. This user interaction limits the scalability of the approach as soon as the invariants cannot be proved by the Isabelle decision procedures. Moreover, proof terms are Isabelle proof scripts that have to be rerun. Because tactics can boil down to proof search, the eciency of the proof checking is not clear. By using an abstract interpretation certied within Coq, the analyser directly produces a proof (namely, a post-xpoint) that can be communicated and understood by the proof checker.
The Mobile Resource Guarantee (MRG) project [5, 4] has produced a fundamental PCC infrastructure for proving properties related to the resource consumption of a code with explicit memory management. For example, they want to establish that a given code can avoid dynamic memory allocation by re-cycling memory that is no longer being used. Albert, Hermenegildo and Puebla have proposed to use abstract interpretation for automatically producing analysis-carrying code [1] . They develop a PCC framework for constraint logic programs in which a CLP abstract interpreter calculates a program invariant (a xpoint) that is sucient to imply a given security policy. The xpoint is sent to the code consumer who uses the abstract interpreter to check in one iteration that the certicate is a xpoint. Our work improves over this approach in three ways. First, our FPCC approach provides transmittable proofs of correctness of our analysers which means that they do not have to be part of the trusted computing basethis is not dealt with in [1] . Second, the certicates in [1] are complete xpoints (the analysis answer tables) which could be further compacted with our xpoint compression algorithm. Finally, their approach works for a high-level source code language (CLP) whereas we have directly addressed the problem of analysing byte code.
For PCC, the size of proof terms has been a recurring problem. Several approaches have been proposed to tackle this problem. Necula and Lee [21] enhance the LF type-checker with an ecient reconstruction algorithm that allows a more compact representation of proofs. Works closer to ours are the oracle-based checkers of Necula and Rahul [22] Instead of sending explicit representations of certicates with a mobile code, we encode certicates as strategies that the code consumer executes in order to reconstruct a suitable post-xpoint that will imply the given security policy.
Such strategies are generated from certicates and can be further tuned to minimise memory consumption of the checker. Indeed, proof checkers only need to verify the existence of a suitable post-xpoint, without having to recreate it in its entirety. This is taken advantage of in the garbage-collecting strategies that we have dened.
The architecture has been implemented and tested with a certied interval analysis of array-manipulating byte code in order to generate certicates attesting that a given code will not attempt to access an array outside its bounds.
The interval analysis uses a novel kind of abstract domains in which syntactic expressions are mixed with abstract values. This symbolic representation allows to keep track of the expression used to compute a particular abstract valuean information which is otherwise lost when compiling from high-level languages to byte code. The syntactic expressions add just enough relational information to the otherwise non-relational interval analysis to deal properly with the propagation of the information obtained from conditional instruc-
tions. This analysis technique should be of interest to other analyses of lowlevel code.
The whole Coq development, including a working checker, is available for download at http://www.irisa.fr/lande/pichardie/PCC/.
Several issues remain open for further investigation.
• The theory of strategies for reconstruction xpoints from Section 5 could be developed further, notably with the aim of determining general conditions for the existence of optimal strategies. Furthermore, the trade-o between the length of a strategy (and hence its execution time) and its memory consumption should be elucidated.
• The class of security policies considered should be enlarged to include temporal policies and policies related to the way the code consumes the resources of the host machine. Here, we have chosen to deal with the arrayout-of-bounds policy, to make the presentation focused but the framework can accommodate other policies as long as there are certied analysers to nd the relevant information.
• We have illustrated our PCC framework with an interval-based analysis but the framework is prepared to accommodate more precise relational analyses such as e.g., octagon-based analyses [18] as implemented in the industrial strength C program analyser Astree [12] . An interesting, concrete illustration of how optimised and certied analysers co-exist in our framework would be to use the highly optimised (but non-certied) abstract domains of Astree for building certicates that would then be checked by a checker built from a certied but non-optimised octagon byte code analyser.
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